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One of the main determinants of the level of dynamism of business investment is the efficacy of 
the legal system, as an essential element of the institutional framework of an economy. This 
article sets out an empirical approach to the impact of the efficacy of justice on the investment 
decisions of a sample of Spanish firms. Drawing on the cross-provincial heterogeneity in the court 
congestion rate, and how it changes over time, this analysis suggests there is a positive and 
significant correlation between efficacy in the civil justice system and business investment in 
Spain.
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The author of this article is Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti of the Directorate General 
Economics, Statistics and Research.1 
Introduction
The design and functioning of the institutional framework of an economy are essential 
to explain the level of efficiency with which the economy uses and allocates its 
productive resources.2 The legal system is a key element of this institutional 
framework, and its quality and efficacy may affect, inter alia, the level of aggregate 
investment in the economy and business demographics.3 In particular, a legal system 
that fails to offer sufficient guarantees, or that fails to operate with due diligence 
when there may be aggrieved parties, will curb business investment4 and, by 
extension, the growth of productivity and overall economic output.
On a series of metrics, the functioning of the Spanish legal system in general has 
various shortcomings compared with the legal systems of other comparable 
countries. Thus, for example, in terms of the duration of cases at first instance, Spain 
is above the OECD average.5 In addition, in the last recession Spain had one of the 
highest litigation rates in the OECD,6 both as a proportion of GDP and in per capita 
terms.
Taking this evidence into consideration, the article aims to assess the impact that the 
efficacy of the Spanish legal system, proxied by the court congestion rate, could be 
1 The analysis presented here represents the opinions of the author, which do not necessarily coincide with those 
of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. This analytical article summarises the main conclusions drawn by 
Dejuán and Mora-Sanguinetti (2019 and 2021). 
2 See, inter alia, North (1990 and1994), Hall and Jones (1999) and Helpman (2008).
3 See, for example, Knack and Keefer (1995), Nawaz (2015) and Eslamloueyan and Jafari (2019).
4 Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) illustrated some of the problems pertaining to investment decisions, 
documenting the complications associated with the introduction of a printing press in a plant. Many similar 
examples could be used, such as the purchase of laboratory equipment or elevators. This type of equipment 
requires a series of adaptations that detract from their external market value once they have been ordered. For 
instance, an elevator with specific measurements cannot be readapted to a different building, or at least only at 
great expense. Therefore, the contract not only generates a state of dependency for the buyer, but potentially also 
for the seller, and this could be inappropriately used to its advantage by the counterparty. In such cases, the good 
functioning of the legal system is especially important in order to generate trust.
5 In Spain, cases at first instance last for 272 days, compared with the OECD average of 238 days. This is consistent 
with the figures published by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), which suggest that 
Spanish courts would need 318 days to resolve a dispute, compared with the 237 days on average required by 
the courts of the CEPEJ member countries. See CEPEJ (2016), Mora-Sanguinetti, Martínez-Matute and García-
Posada (2017) and Palumbo et al. (2013). 
6 See Palumbo et al. (2013).
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having on business investment in Spain.7 For this purpose, it combines two databases: 
the Banco de España’s Central Balance Sheet Data Office integrated database (CBI, by 
its Spanish abbreviation), which provides detailed information on the investment 
decisions of more than 650,000 Spanish firms; and the database of the General Council 
of the Judiciary (CGPJ, by its Spanish abbreviation), which provides information on the 
functioning of the legal system at the local level in the period 2002-2016.
The analysis finds that the level of judicial efficacy has a positive and significant 
impact on business investment and that its scale is economically relevant. In this 
respect, the findings suggest that reducing court congestion in Spain could have 
far-reaching favourable implications in aggregate terms, in particular, through the 
stimulus it would provide to economic growth in the medium and long term.
The remainder of this analytical article is structured as follows. The following section 
presents the data used to analyse business investment and the efficacy of the legal 
system in Spain. This is followed by a description of the estimation strategy. The next 
section presents the main findings of the analysis, and the last section a number of 
brief conclusions.
Measuring business investment and judicial efficacy in Spain
Firm-level investment
This article uses the Banco de España’s CBI to obtain detailed annual information on 
the main balance sheet headings of a broad sample of Spanish firms over the period 
2002-2016.8
Among other variables, the database provides information on firms’ debt volumes (net 
debt to assets), their interest payments and other financial costs, and their return on 
assets (ROA), all of which the academic literature has generally considered to be 
determinants of the level of business investment.9 For the purposes of this article, the 
gross investment ratio – defined as each firm’s gross fixed capital formation (tangible 
and intangible) to its total capital stock – is used to measure investment. 
The sample overall contains more than 3.5 million observations for a total of 653,289 
firms.10 Table  1 has more data on the characteristics of the database and the 
variables used.
 7 More in-depth conclusions may be found in Dejuán and Mora-Sanguinetti (2019 and 2021).
 8 For further details on this database, see Dejuán and Ghirelli (2018) and Dejuán and Mora-Sanguinetti (2019 and 
2021).
 9 See Gulen and Ion (2016) and Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). 
10 All the firms selected appear in the database at least in two years in the period 2002-2016. The resulting sample 
amounts to around 50% of Spanish non-financial corporations in 2015. Consistent with Spanish business 
demographics, approximately 97% of the firms in the sample are small firms (with fewer than 50 employees and 
turnover or assets under €10 million), while medium-sized firms (with 50 to 250 employees, turnover of 
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Judicial efficacy in Spain
In this article the efficacy of the functioning of the legal system is proxied by the 
court congestion rate.11 At each point in time (t) and in each province (p), this rate is 
defined, for a specific judicial body, as the number of unresolved disputes (cases 
carried over from previous years plus new cases recorded in the current year) over 





Pending cases +New cases
Congestion rate =  
Resolved cases
 
According to the literature, the higher the court congestion rate, the longer firms will 
have to wait for their disputes to be settled in court and the higher the expected cost, 
and therefore, the lower the efficacy of justice (see, inter alia, Palumbo et al. (2013)). 
For the purposes of this article, the congestion rate is calculated for the civil courts, 
as this is where disputes arising between private firms or individuals relating to 
private contracts, for example as the result of a misinterpretation of contract or 
breach of agreement, are heard. The rate is calculated specifically for the declarative 
stage of the legal process.12 
Chart 1 depicts the change over time in the congestion rate in the civil courts for 
Spain overall. It shows how this variable rose sharply, coinciding with the years of 
the global financial crisis (2008-2009) and, in the specific case of the Spanish 
€10-€50 million or assets of €10-€43 million) and large firms (with over 250 employees and turnover and assets 
over €50 million and €43 million, respectively), each account for approximately 1.5% of the total. 
11 For more details on the court congestion rate, see García-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti (2015).
12 Calculated for all cases heard at first instance, taking into account courts of first instance (larger cities) and courts 
of first instance and examining courts (smaller cities), for all litigation procedures in all areas.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF FIRM SAMPLE USED
Table 1
SOURCE: Dejuan and Mora-Sanguinetti (2021). Sample taken from the Banco de España’s CBI for the period 2002-2016.
Variable
Number of
observations Average Standard deviation Minimum Maximum






Debt burden 3,523,890 0.595 0.976 0 2.771
3,523,890 0.688 0.474 0 4.830
3,523,890 0.045 0.532 -1 10.231
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economy, with the abrupt correction in the imbalances built up over years in the 
external and real estate sectors. Ginsburg and Hoetker (2006), Palumbo et al. (2013) 
and Mora-Sanguinetti, Martínez-Matute and García-Posada (2017) have also 
documented, at the international level, a certain degree of countercyclical behaviour 
in court congestion, which would be consistent with the greater difficulties firms 
face to perform their contracts in downturns.
As can be seen in Chart 2, which depicts the average congestion rate in the civil 
courts in each province in the period 2002-2016, there is a marked degree of cross-
provincial heterogeneity in judicial efficacy in Spain, with the provinces that 
concentrate the bulk of the population tending to be those that post a worse relative 
performance. The rest of this article draws precisely on this cross-provincial 
heterogeneity (and how it evolves over time) to analyse the impact of judicial efficacy 
on Spanish firms’ investment decisions.
Estimating the impact of the efficacy of justice on investment
By way of illustration, Chart 3 shows a negative relationship between the average 
business investment rate at the provincial level (calculated on CBI data) in Spain 
during the period 2002-2016 and the congestion rate in the civil courts. To confirm 
the robustness of this very tentative aggregate evidence, below we estimate a 
business investment model following Gulen and Ion (2016) and Baker, Bloom and 
Davis (2016). In particular, we examine the relationship between the gross investment 
ratio at the firm level (the dependent variable) and the court congestion rate (the 
COURT CONGESTION
Chart 1
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main explanatory variable), both of which were defined in the previous section, 
controlling for other variables that the academic literature has generally identified as 
important determinants of business investment decisions (such as firms’ profitability 
and financial position, and population growth).
Importantly, the inclusion of firm- and provincial-level fixed effects in this model also 
allows us to control for different time-invariant aspects that may also affect investment 
AVERAGE CONGESTION RATE IN CIVIL COURTS BY PROVINCE (2002-2016)
Chart 2
SOURCE: Dejuán and Mora-Sanguinetti (2021).
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Chart 3
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levels (for example, differences in firms’ business practices or in their productive or 
institutional structure). Likewise, by including time fixed effects in the estimations, it 
is possible to control for all those aggregate variables that change over time but not 
across firms, and which may affect business investment decisions (for example, 
aggregate macroeconomic or financial conditions in the economy). 
Table 2 shows the results of estimating different specifications of this business 
investment model at the firm level. In particular, Column 1 regresses the business 
investment ratio on the court congestion rate and other traditional determinants of 
EFFECTS OF THE EFFICACY OF THE CIVIL COURTS ON BUSINESS INVESTMENT (2002-2016)
Table 2
SOURCE: Dejuán and Mora-Sanguinetti (2021).
NOTE: Robust standard errors (clustered by firm and year) in brackets. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.












**3700.0-***4010.0-***7110.0-***5410.0-***3410.0-Civil court congestion rate
(0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0029)
***9660.0***9660.0***9660.0***9660.0***9660.0Cash flow
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033)
***5320.0***4320.0***5320.0***4320.0***4320.0Profitability (EBIT/assets)
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047)
***6800.0-***6800.0-***6800.0-***6800.0-***6800.0-Debt burden
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
***7130.0-***7130.0-***8130.0-***7130.0-***7130.0-Debt ratio (debt/assets)
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028)
***4900.0***4900.0***4900.0***4900.0***4900.0Sales growth
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
2932.38004.5-6349.5-5044.6-Number of lawyers
(8.7060) (8.9947) (9.7568) (12.2518)
Regional: number of courts/
(population + firms)
2.0527*** 2.0463*** 1.9790*** 1.5603***
(0.2287) (0.2356) (0.2302) (0.2940)
***4052.0-**9491.0-**4681.0-**5512,0-Regional: population growth
(0.0764) (0.0754) (0.0770) (0.0707)
***7210.0***6210.0***0310.0Regional: credit/GDP
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032)




3,511,238 3,511,239 3,511,240 3,511,241 3,511,242Observations
6513.06513.06513.05513.05513.0 R
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investment. The latter are significant and affect the business investment rate in the 
expected direction. For the purposes of this article, however, the most important 
finding is that the court congestion rate has an adverse and significant impact, even 
after controlling for firm-specific characteristics and time fixed effects.13 These 
results are robust to the inclusion of various variables that seek to control for the 
local economic cycle (Columns 2 to 5). 
Quantitatively, the ratios estimated in Table 2 suggest that an increase of one unit in 
the congestion rate results in a 1 pp drop in investment. An example may be useful 
to obtain a better idea of these magnitudes. In 2010, Alicante was one of the provinces 
with the highest level of court congestion (2.2, or 220 unresolved cases for every 100 
resolved), while Álava had one of the lowest levels (1.4, or 140 unresolved cases for 
every 100 resolved). According to the ratios estimated here, had Alicante had the 
same judicial efficacy as Álava, its business investment ratio, as defined above, 
would have been 0.8 pp higher.
Conclusions
The economic literature suggests that the quality of the institutional framework, and 
of the legal system as a part thereof, can significantly affect the incentive to invest 
and investment dynamics. In particular, an ineffective legal system could create 
insecurity and undermine trust among economic agents, and therefore penalise the 
business investment rate.
In keeping with these arguments, this analytical article finds that the lack of efficacy 
in the civil courts, proxied by their congestion rate, has an adverse and significant 
impact on business investment in Spain. Therefore, to raise the level of private 
investment, which is an essential driver of economic growth in the medium and long 
term, an economic policy recommendation would be to increase the efficacy of the 
Spanish legal system by reducing its high congestion rates, thus enhancing legal 
certainty in contracts between private firms. 
1.7.2021.
13 These results are consistent with the analyses carried out at the international level mentioned in footnote 3. The 
results presented are for the impact of judicial efficacy in the civil courts at the “declarative stage”. Dejuán and 
Mora-Sanguinetti (2021) also estimate the effect of judicial efficacy on investment at the “enforcement stage”, 
which may be necessary if the parties to a contract fail to comply with a court decision issued at the declarative 
stage. The results suggest that the adverse effect of court congestion on business investment at the declarative 
stage is ten times greater than at the enforcement stage. This could be related to the fact that fewer firms actually 
reach this second stage and, therefore, the overall sensitivity to judicial efficacy is lower. This finding could also 
indicate that firms have a certain degree of trust in the effectiveness of the legal system once a first court ruling 
on a dispute has been issued.
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